Abstract. We consider the impact of scheduling disciplines on the performance of routing in the framework of adversarial queuing. We propose an adversarial model which reflects stalling of packets due to transient failures and explicitly incorporates the feedback produced by the network when packets are stalled. This adversarial model provides a methodology to study stability of routing protocols when flow-control and congestion-control mechanisms affect the volume of traffic. We show that any scheduling policy that is universally stable, in the regular model of routing that additionally allows packets to have two priorities, remains stable in the proposed adversarial model.
Introduction
We consider routing in communication networks when transient transmission failures and congestion control mechanisms affect the number of packets handled by the nodes. Routing protocols do not act on their own but operate in an environment affected by flow control and congestion control. The overall goal is managing the rates of transmissions between pairs of nodes to provide fluency of traffic and avoiding congestive collapse, as means to optimize the use of the network. Routing protocols may drop packets, for instance when the processing time assigned to a packet has been exhausted, which has a stabilizing effect on the performance of routing. Because of the complexities of such systems, the traditional stochastic approach to investigate performance metrics encounters technical issues of mathematical nature which hinder obtaining better insights into what hinders network's performance and how to improve, see [26] . The stochastic approach usually makes strong assumptions about how traffic is generated, which may be considered unrealistic.
In this paper we consider network traffic in the framework of models that concentrate on only a few aspects of traffic generation and routing functionality. This allows to gain better understanding of traffic efficiency phenomena while avoiding making stochastic assumptions and abstracting from the low level mechanisms implemented in the network and transport layers.
The underlying components of the network functionality we assume are as follows. First, we want to have unbounded buffers in each node to accommodate any number of packets in transit. Second, we prune routing from any mechanisms of dropping packets in intermediate nodes, while the packets are still on their way to the assigned destinations.
These assumptions have been traditionally adopted in the models of adversarial traffic. Adversarial queuing was proposed as a methodology to analyze worst-case bounds on traffic within a traffic environment determined by parameters like injection rates and burstiness, see [5, 12] . The basic aspect of a satisfactory behavior of a system in adversarial queuing is the stability of traffic, which is defined as the property that the number of packets handled simultaneously is bounded at all times.
Our goal is to extend the model of adversarial queuing by incorporating features representing congestion control. This includes the feedback provided by the network to the nodes to notify them that some packets have been stalled.
The routing protocols that we consider do not drop packets intentionally, but still some packets may be delayed due to malfunctioning of the network infrastructure. This includes transient wire-link failures or interferences on wireless links, so that packets may occasionally fail to be successfully transmitted between nodes.
Another related situation occurs when scheduled packets are delayed due to nodes being switched off for energy savings. The recently adopted IEEE 802.3az Energy Efficient Ethernet (EEE) standard, as described in [20] , is expected to be conducive to energy savings in local area networks by implementing mechanisms to have nodes temporarily unavailable to cooperate in routing, see [17] for more on this issue.
Our contribution.
We propose an adversarial model to study routing in faulty systems. The adversary may learn of the failures after some time interval. Delayed feedback is more realistic than assuming that failures are known in advance when an execution of a routing protocol starts. Concerning stability, we demonstrate that any scheduling policy universally stable in the 2-priority model, as introduced byÀlvarez et al. [2] , remains stable in the adversarial model that we propose.
Related work. The adversarial methodology to study store-and-froward routing in wired networks was proposed by Andrews et al. [5] and Borodin et al [12] . Adversarial communication in wireless networks was considered by Andrews and Zhang [6] . Stability of broadcast protocols in adversarial multiple-access channels was studied by Anantharamu et al. [3, 4] , Bender et al. [8] , and Chlebus et al. [14, 15] .
Adversarial models capturing failures have been proposed in the literature in various network settings. Borodin et al. [13] considered slowdowns associated with links. The papers [11, 16, 21, 22] , considered dynamic changes in the link capacities, with the intension to interpret such transient decreasing of capacity of a link as a transient failure of the link.
Á lvarez et al. [2] proposed a model that allows transient disruptions of the connectivity of the system. That model was extended byÁlvarez et al. [1] to incorporate node failures. The models mentioned above assume that the adversary can make a link fail at any round. The papers [1, 2] and [23] assume that, at each round, the adversary knows when links fail. It is then natural to have the adversary be equipped with the power to adjust the injection of packets to such events, possibly even before link failures occur. We propose an approach in which the constraints on the adversary, in terms of the injection rate and burstiness, are modified after some time delay triggered by malfunctioning of links.
Adversarial approach has been applied to modeling malfunctioning of wireless networks, including single-hop multi channels. Bhandari and Vaidya [9, 10] considered broadcast protocols in multi-hop wireless networks with nodes prone to failures. Gilbert et al. [18] considered a multi-channel where the adversary controls how information flows on subsets of channels. Meier et al. [25] considered adversarial multi-channel single-hop networks when some t channels out of m could be disrupted in a round, with m known and t not known.
Adversarial queuing was applied when studying interference and jamming in wireless networks, including single-hop multi channels and multiple access channels. Lim et al. [23] proposed an adversarial model to capture interferences among the links in wireless networks. In this case, at each round the adversary assigns specific edge rate vectors that are assumed to keep the network stable. These vectors can be interpreted as reflecting the degree in which edges fail by not providing their full capacity. Anantharamu et al. [3, 4] considered multiple access channels with adversarial jamming, when the attached stations perceive jamming as colliding attempts by different stations to access the channel. Awerbuch et al. [7] studied saturation throughput of randomized protocols in adversarial multiple access channels subject to jamming. Gilbert et al. [19] studied single-hop multi-channel networks with communication subject to adversarial jamming.
For a general discussion of topics related to the mechanisms of flow and congestion control, see [24, 26] .
The adversarial model
We propose an adversarial approach to study stability of routing which captures packet delays due to failures of network elements. This methodology is an extension of the regular leaky-bucket adversarial model determined by injection rate and burstiness. The new component is the feedback from the network after a transmission that does not go through. This feedback restricts the adversary's capability to inject packets.
We will model networks as directed graphs G = (V, E), where the vertices in V represent the nodes of the network and the edges in E are the links connecting nodes. The orientation of an edge represents the direction in which the link can transmit data. The networks we consider are synchronous, in that an execution of a communication protocol is partitioned into rounds.
Each packet is injected by the adversary into some node and assigned a path through the network to traverse. Such paths cannot contain the same link more than once. If more than one packet wishes to cross an edge e in a round, then a routing protocol chooses one of these packets to send across e, while the remaining packets are kept in a queue at the tail of the edge e. When a packet reaches the destination node then it is absorbed, which means that it disappears.
A packet travels through the network with additional information associated with it, like the destination address or the round when it was injected into the network. A packet encapsulated in this information makes an atomic unit of data to be transmitted through links, which we call simply a message. Messages and rounds are scaled to each other, in that it takes one round to transmit a message through a link.
In this work, we consider routing environments in which a packet scheduled to be transmitted over a link in a round may fail to traverse the link, this possibly happening for a consecutive number of rounds at a time. When we use the terms faulty round an faulty link, then these refer to situations where failures in messages to traverse links occur. We assume that messages are never lost in transmissions, in that they are successfully handed over from a node to the next neighbor on the traversed path, until the packets reach their destination.
A leaky-bucket regulation
We define the adversarial model by how traffic is regulated. We use a traffic descriptor using the notion of a leaky token bucket, as proposed by Turner [27] . Traffic demand is determined by packets injected into the network, each packet assigned a path to traverse. The notion of packets becoming stalled in their journeys is to represent a general malfunctioning of the system that results in a packet getting delayed, when an attempted transmission on a link that does not go through, regardless of what is the reason. A packet is stalled in round t if it is attempted to be transmitted but the transmission does not go through the link.
An adversary is defined by three parameters: injection rate r, such that 0 < r ≤ 1, burstiness b, which is a positive integer, and feedback delay δ, which is also a positive integer. These three parameters together determine the adversarial type (r, b, δ).
We will consider two kinds of virtual objects called tokens and antitokens. A token is in a bucket and represents the ability to inject a packet. An antitoken represents a stalled packet, and so the need to decrease the traffic by one packet to avoid congestion.
A single bucket is a variable K storing a number; K is initialized to 0. When K ≥ 0, then K is interpreted as the number of tokens in the bucket. The bucket's capacity is b. In general, K may assume negative values; in such a case the bucket does not contain any tokens. The operations performed on K are as follows.
1) In each round, r is added to K by K ← K + r. If at this point K > b then K is modified by K ← b, which is interpreted as the bucket's overflow.
2) The adversary injects some i packets and simultaneously removes i tokens from the bucket by performing K ← K −i. For this to be possible to perform, the inequalities 0 < i ≤ K need to hold.
3) Each stalled packet creates an antitoken carrying a value. The value of a newly created antitoken is initiated to δ. The value of an antitoken gets decremented by 1 in each round. An antitoken disappears in two possible ways, as decided by the adversary. One results in removing the antitoken and simultaneously modifying K ← K −1 while the token's value is still positive. Another is when the value becomes 0, then the antitoken disappears, and simultaneously K ← K − 1; this represents the maximally delayed feedback.
Intuitively, when the adversary decides to annihilate a token, then this represents the moment when the adversary obtains a feedback from the network of a stalled packet. One token and one antitoken disappear simultaneously, as by annihilation resulting from their getting mixed together, which explains the terminology. This completes the specification how a single bucket operates, when it is considered in isolation independently from other buckets. The complete picture is such that we associate a bucket K e with each directed edge e of the network.
The operations on these buckets are coordinated as follows:
1) Every bucket gets incremented by δ in each round, subject to possible overflow which makes a bucket store precisely b tokens.
2) A packet has a path assigned to traverse; when a packet gets stalled then an antitoken is created for each bucket K e associated with an edge e that the packet is still to traverse; all these anti tokens are said to be related.
3) When the adversary injects a packet to traverse a path, then it removes a token from each bucket K e associated with any edge e of the path. For this to be possible to be performed, each bucket on the path needs to include at least one token.
4) When the adversary destroys an antitoken g created by a stalled packet p on some link, then such a destruction, and the matching operation K ← K − 1, is performed on each related token g created on a link which p was still to traverse when g was created, and the bucket associated with a link that p was still to traverse when g was created.
This completes the specification of how the adversary can inject packets into the network.
To specify the adversarial model fully, we need to state precisely what the adversary controls. For instance, we interpret annihilation of a token from a bucket, and the matching removal of an antitoken by the adversary, as representing the event when the adversary obtains feedback from the network about a stalled packet. There are two possible cases here: one is to consider all the possible worst-case times when the adversary obtains the feedback, and another to assign the power to determine these times to the adversary. We may observe at this point that both these approaches are equivalent, as the adversarial model is to capture a worst-case behavior of the system. Therefore we choose the logically simplest approach to interpret the adversary as controlling both packet injections and any malfunctioning of the network. In particular, the adversary controls which packets get stalled and when, and also when the feedback about a stalled packet is obtained, independently for each packet.
Comparison with the regular adversary
The
Proof. We compare the two adversarial models as regulated by a leaky bucket of tokens. When the delayed-feedback adversary of the type (r, b, δ) does not induce any stalling among the packets, then the regulatory properties of a bucket of tokens determine the regular adversary of the type (r, b).
Corollary 1.
If a scheduling policy is unstable in a network G under a scheduling policy S against the regular adversary of type (r, b) then this same scheduling policy S is unstable in the network G against a delayed-feedback adversary of the type (r, b, δ), for any positive integer δ.
Proof. Consider an unstable execution of routing against the adversary of the type (r, b) when the scheduling policy S is applied. A similar unstable execution can be produced by the adversary of the type (r, b, δ), by Proposition 1.
We consider the following specific scheduling policies: first-in-first-out (FIFO), nearest-to-go (NTG), farthest-from-source (FFS), and slowest-previous-link with ties broken using the nearest-from-source (SPL-NFS). Theorem 1. Each of the scheduling policies FIFO, NTG, FFS and SPL-NFS is unstable in some network against a delayed-feedback adversary of injection rate less than 1.
Proof. We rely on Corollary 1 and the instability results obtained for the regular adversary. The instability of the scheduling policies FIFO, NTG, and FFS follows from the respective instabilities obtained by Andrews et al. [5] , and the instability of SPL-NFS follows from the related result given by Blesa et al. [11] .
Properties of the adversarial model with feedback
In this section, we investigate properties of the adversarial model with feedback presented in the previous section. A key point of the model is the concept of antitoken, which represents a stalled packet and thus the need to decrease the bound on the future traffic by one packet to avoid congestion. We re-define the adversary by expressing its power in a more analytical way to facilitate the future technical analysis. More precisely, we describe our adversary in terms of an admissibility condition, which involves a delay function accounting for the impact of each antitoken's annihilation on decreasing the amount of traffic that could be injected.
Reformulation of the adversarial model
In each round, the adversary may inject packets into some of the nodes in the network. In order for stability to be achievable in principle, the adversary needs to be subject to restrictions. These restrictions imposed on the regular leakybucket adversary are represented by its adversarial type (b, r), where b ≥ 1 is a natural number and r satisfies 0 ≤ r < 1. The injection rate r models the rate at which a packet can be injected into the network that need to traverse the same link, for each link in the network. The burstiness b represents the maximum number of packets, that need to traverse the same edge, that the adversary can inject into the network in one round. The precise interpretation of such a type (b, r) is that in any time interval τ of length |τ | the adversary may inject at most r|τ | + b packets that need to traverse the same edge. The adversary is free to choose both the source and the destination node for any injected packet. It also determines the individual path from the source to the destination that any specific packet needs to traverse.
An extension to the adversarial model with delays is as follows. Let I δ q (t) represent the total number of packets which the adversary injects at round t that have queue q on their path. We say that the packet injections are admissible for rate r and burstiness b if the following holds for all q:
where T represents a contiguous time interval and s δ q is a delay function. The restriction (1) is referred to as the admissibility condition. Figure 1 gives an illustrative example of the admissibility condition in a queue q. This model is referred to as feedback delayed by up to δ, or DF δ in concise notation.
The function s δ q provides the rounds when the adversary becomes constrained by stalling that have occurred at queue q. We interpret such rounds as the adversary obtaining "notifications" from the network about the delay. Such notifications represent annihilations of antitokens. A formal specification of s δ q is provided in Definition 4 in Subsection 3.2.
At any round t, the adversary takes into account the values of s δ q (t ), for t ≤ t, based only on the notifications received up to that round, as reflected in packets injected into the system. The way it is defined in Definition 4 is equivalent to the previously defined method of creating and annihilating antitokens, corresponding to each instance of a stalled packet.
The admissibility condition captures the following intuitions:
-When there are no annihilations of antitokens, then the adversary is allowed to inject as many packets as in the regular adversarial model.
-If some tokens get annihilated, then the adversary is allowed to inject a number of packets as determined by the traditional adversarial model, decreased by the number of annihilations as specified in the leaky-bucket regulation mechanism by way of tokens and antitokens.
The definition of stability in DF δ is similar to the definition stated under other adversarial models. Definition 1. Let G be a network, P a scheduling policy and A an adversary of type (r, b). Let D be and execution of protocol P against A in G. For a positive integer t, let Q D (t) be the number of packets simultaneously queued in the system at time t. Protocol P is stable on G against A if in each such an execution D, all the numbers Q D (t) are bounded. Protocol P is universally stable if it is stable against any adversary of injection rate r < 1 and in any network.
Delay functions and reactive functions
We say that a queue q is stalled in round t if some packet in the queue is stalled in this round. Next we introduce the function w q which represents the rounds where delays occur at queue q.
Definition 2.
Consider an execution of a system up to round t. Given a queue q, we define the function w q (t) such that w q (t) = 1 if the queue q is stalled at round t and w q (t) = 0 otherwise.
The rounds that are added to a stalled packet's itinerary occur as a side effect of the adversary's actions. The adversary receives information about the extra rounds of stalled-packets occurring at the different queues. We consider the case where the adversary becomes constrained by the stalled packets after some time delay; the parameter δ is used to bound such a maximum delay.
Next we introduce the notations T q , D δ q , and w δ q . We want w δ q to model the rounds where the adversary becomes constrained by the queue q getting stalled and it also provides the number of the notifications.
Definition 3. We will use the following terminology and notations:
1. Let T q be the set of these rounds t for which w q (t) = 1 holds.
2. For a given function w q , let the function D δ q : T q → N be such that D δ q (t) = t , for t ∈ T q and t ≤ t ≤ t + δ, where t is the time when the feedback about the queue q being staled at time t arrives. Reactive functions. When the adversary receives a notification of a queue q getting delayed, then this indicates that some packet in this queue will need an extra round. In order to maintain stability, the adversary must react to take into account such eventuality. Such a reaction is performed as if temporarily the injection rate were reduced, which is implemented by the mechanism of tokens and antitokens. Several notifications could be received at the same time, so the adversary needs to take that fact into account. For instance, if at some time t the adversary receives three notifications of stalling for some given link, it will reduce the long term injection rate of a packet that will cross such a link for three rounds after time t, provided such rounds have not been already reduced because of previous notifications, in which case the next "available" rounds will be chosen.
To formalize this, we define the function s δ q , which is intended to model the rounds when the adversary will react to a delayed notification of stalling which has occurred at a queue q. 
The stability of scheduling policies
In this section, we show that some scheduling policies are stable in the adversarialqueuing model DF δ . We will use an auxiliary model, known as the priority model, which was introduced in [2] . We refer to the model as c-priority model when there are c priorities. It is obtained by modifying the regular adversarial model [5, 12] so that packets have priorities in the following sense. If, at a certain time, more than one packet located at the same queue is ready to be transmitted, then the scheduling policy chooses the packet of the highest priority.
The following fact provides a relationship between the number of extra rounds due to delays and the number of reactive rounds at a given time interval.
Proof. By the definition of function w δ q , for each round t where w q (t) = 1, there is a round t , which is not necessarily different for each t, such that w δ q (t ) = 0 and t ≤ t ≤ t + δ.
From the mechanism used to construct s We proceed with considering the following two cases.
The case of t > t :
This cannot happen by the construction of s δ q , because t aux in Definition 4 is always at least t.
The case of t > t + δ:
We prove this case by contradiction. Let t 1 be the first round such that rD On the other hand, we also have that rD δ (t m ) = t * m . All this contradicts our assumption that t 1 is the first round such that rD δ q (t 1 ) = t * 1 and t * 1 > t 1 + δ. The fact that the inequality t ≤ t ≤ t + δ holds means that for each t such that w q (t) = 1, the corresponding image in s δ q will be for a round t that is delayed by at most δ rounds. We conclude that the inequality t∈T w q (t) ≤ t∈T s δ q (t) + δ holds true.
The following Lemma 2 shows that if a given scheduling policy is unstable in DF δ then it is also unstable in the 2-priority model. Lemma 2. If a given scheduling policy is unstable against an adversary with injection rate r and burstiness b in DF δ , then such a scheduling policy is unstable against some adversary of injection rate r and burstiness b in the 2-priority model, where 0 < r < 1.
Proof. Let us take an adversary A in DF δ with parameters (r, b). Then, according to the admissibility condition in Equation 1 and by Lemma 1, the following estimates hold.
The right-hand side of this bound equals r t∈T (1 − w q (t)) + b for b = rδ + b. We obtain by algebraic manipulations that
where we used w q (t) ≤ τ τ +1 and r = r+τ τ +1 . Observe that 0 < r < 1. Consider an adversarial pattern for injection rate r and burstiness b that results in an unstable execution of the given scheduling policy. Based on the obtained estimate on
we define the corresponding adversarial pattern in the 2-priority model, as specified in the claim of the lemma. The constructed specific adversarial behavior follows the same injection pattern as defined by the adversary A in DF δ , with a low priority given to all these packets, and additionally it injects a high priority packet at the starting queue q in each round t such that w q (t) = 1.
Consider the execution of the original scheduling policy under the defined adversarial pattern in the 2-priority adversarial model. By the inequality
which holds in the execution in DF δ , we obtain that queue-congestion of the injected packets, whether of high or of low priority, is constrained by the injection rate r , with r < 1, and burstiness b v . This is because t∈T I δ q (t) from the original execution in DF δ corresponds to the node congestion of the low-priority packets, and t∈T w q (t) corresponds to the queue-congestion of the high-priority packets, both in the 2-priority execution.
It remains to argue that the newly defined execution is also unstable in the 2-priority model. The following invariant holds.
There is at most one high-priority packet at a queue in any round in the latter execution, and the transmissions of low-priority packets are the same in both considered executions.
This follows by induction on the round numbers, because any such a packet is injected in the beginning of each round when a extra round due to stalling occurs in the execution in DF δ through some queue. Since the execution in DF δ results in unbounded queues, the other one also does.
Theorem 2. Any scheduling policy that is universally stable in the 2-priority model is universally stable in DF δ .
Proof. We suppose it is otherwise in order to arrive at a contradiction. This means that there is a scheduling policy S that is universal in the 2-priority model but for any burstiness b there is some rate r such that the inequalities 0 < r < 1 hold and such that S is unstable against the adversary with rate r and burstiness b in DF δ . Let us consider such an unstable execution. By Lemma 2, there is an unstable execution of the scheduling policy S in the 2-priority model, for some injection rate r such that 0 < r < 1 and for burstiness b .
This contradicts the universal stability of S in the 2-priority model.
À lvarez et al. [2] showed that FTG (farthest-to-go), NFS (nearest-fromsource) and SIS (shortest-in-system) are universally stable for the 2-priority model. By this and Theorem 2 we obtain the following corollary. 
Conclusion
We study routing in the suitable adversarial frameworks. We investigate how unexpected packet delays may affect routing's performance. Packet delays represent either malfunctioning of the network's infrastructure, implemented below the network layer, or transient unavailability of nodes due to energy saving policies.
We assume that routing protocols are embedded into flow control and connection control mechanisms. These mechanisms react to packet delays by spreading the suitable information through the network with the goal to decrease packet injection rates.
We propose how to study stability of various classes of scheduling policies in such network settings. To this end, we propose a new adversarial model that has delays built into its machinery. The model we consider is an extension of the regular leaky-bucket model, which is determined only by the injection rate and burstiness.
Each transmission that fails to go through results in a feedback, which abstracts the flow control and connection control mechanisms. We treat this feedback as if given to the adversary, because it decreases the adversary's capability to inject packets.
